XML External Entity Prevention Cheat Sheet¶
Introduction¶
XML eXternal Entity injection (XXE), which is now part of the OWASP Top 10 via the point A4, is a type of attack against an application that parses XML input.
XXE issue is referenced under the ID 611 in the Common Weakness Enumeration referential.
This attack occurs when untrusted XML input containing a reference to an external entity is processed by a weakly configured XML parser.
This attack may lead to the disclosure of confidential data, denial of service, Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), port scanning from the perspective of the machine where the parser is located, and other system impacts. The following guide provides concise information to prevent this vulnerability.
For more information on XXE, please visit XML External Entity (XXE).
General Guidance¶
The safest way to prevent XXE is always to disable DTDs (External Entities) completely. Depending on the parser, the method should be similar to the following:
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
Disabling DTDs also makes the parser secure against denial of services (DOS) attacks such as Billion Laughs. If it is not possible to disable DTDs completely, then external entities and external document type declarations must be disabled in the way that's specific to each parser.
Detailed XXE Prevention guidance for a number of languages and commonly used XML parsers in those languages is provided below.
C/C++¶
libxml2¶
The Enum xmlParserOption should not have the following options defined:
XML_PARSE_NOENT
: Expands entities and substitutes them with replacement textXML_PARSE_DTDLOAD
: Load the external DTD
Note:
Per: According to this post, starting with libxml2 version 2.9, XXE has been disabled by default as committed by the following patch.
Search for the usage of the following APIs to ensure there is no XML_PARSE_NOENT
and XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD
defined in the parameters:
xmlCtxtReadDoc
xmlCtxtReadFd
xmlCtxtReadFile
xmlCtxtReadIO
xmlCtxtReadMemory
xmlCtxtUseOptions
xmlParseInNodeContext
xmlReadDoc
xmlReadFd
xmlReadFile
xmlReadIO
xmlReadMemory
libxerces-c¶
Use of XercesDOMParser
do this to prevent XXE:
XercesDOMParser *parser = new XercesDOMParser;
parser->setCreateEntityReferenceNodes(true);
parser->setDisableDefaultEntityResolution(true);
Use of SAXParser, do this to prevent XXE:
SAXParser* parser = new SAXParser;
parser->setDisableDefaultEntityResolution(true);
Use of SAX2XMLReader, do this to prevent XXE:
SAX2XMLReader* reader = XMLReaderFactory::createXMLReader();
parser->setFeature(XMLUni::fgXercesDisableDefaultEntityResolution, true);
Java¶
Java applications using XML libraries are particularly vulnerable to XXE because the default settings for most Java XML parsers is to have XXE enabled. To use these parsers safely, you have to explicitly disable XXE in the parser you use. The following describes how to disable XXE in the most commonly used XML parsers for Java.
JAXP DocumentBuilderFactory, SAXParserFactory and DOM4J¶
DocumentBuilderFactory,
SAXParserFactory
and DOM4J
XML
Parsers can be configured using the same techniques to protect them against XXE.
Only the DocumentBuilderFactory
example is presented here. The JAXP DocumentBuilderFactory
setFeature method allows a developer to control which implementation-specific XML processor features are enabled or disabled.
The features can either be set on the factory or the underlying XMLReader
setFeature method.
Each XML processor implementation has its own features that govern how DTDs and external entities are processed.
For a syntax highlighted example code snippet using SAXParserFactory
, look here.
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException; // catching unsupported features
...
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
String FEATURE = null;
try {
// This is the PRIMARY defense. If DTDs (doctypes) are disallowed, almost all
// XML entity attacks are prevented
// Xerces 2 only - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces2-j/features.html#disallow-doctype-decl
FEATURE = "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl";
dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, true);
// If you can't completely disable DTDs, then at least do the following:
// Xerces 1 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces-j/features.html#external-general-entities
// Xerces 2 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces2-j/features.html#external-general-entities
// JDK7+ - http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities
//This feature has to be used together with the following one, otherwise it will not protect you from XXE for sure
FEATURE = "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities";
dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);
// Xerces 1 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces-j/features.html#external-parameter-entities
// Xerces 2 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces2-j/features.html#external-parameter-entities
// JDK7+ - http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities
//This feature has to be used together with the previous one, otherwise it will not protect you from XXE for sure
FEATURE = "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities";
dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);
// Disable external DTDs as well
FEATURE = "http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd";
dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);
// and these as well, per Timothy Morgan's 2014 paper: "XML Schema, DTD, and Entity Attacks"
dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);
dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
// And, per Timothy Morgan: "If for some reason support for inline DOCTYPEs are a requirement, then
// ensure the entity settings are disabled (as shown above) and beware that SSRF attacks
// (http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html) and denial
// of service attacks (such as billion laughs or decompression bombs via "jar:") are a risk."
// remaining parser logic
...
} catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {
// This should catch a failed setFeature feature
logger.info("ParserConfigurationException was thrown. The feature '" + FEATURE
+ "' is probably not supported by your XML processor.");
...
} catch (SAXException e) {
// On Apache, this should be thrown when disallowing DOCTYPE
logger.warning("A DOCTYPE was passed into the XML document");
...
} catch (IOException e) {
// XXE that points to a file that doesn't exist
logger.error("IOException occurred, XXE may still possible: " + e.getMessage());
...
}
// Load XML file or stream using a XXE agnostic configured parser...
DocumentBuilder safebuilder = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
- Do not include external entities by setting this feature to
false
. - Do not include parameter entities by setting this feature to
false
. - Do not include external DTDs by setting this feature to
false
.
- Disallow an inline DTD by setting this feature to
true
. - Do not include external entities by setting this feature to
false
. - Do not include parameter entities by setting this feature to
false
. - Do not include external DTDs by setting this feature to
false
.
Note: The above defenses require Java 7 update 67, Java 8 update 20, or above, because the above countermeasures for DocumentBuilderFactory
and SAXParserFactory are broken in earlier Java versions, per: CVE-2014-6517.
XMLInputFactory (a StAX parser)¶
StAX parsers such as XMLInputFactory
allow various properties and features to be set.
To protect a Java XMLInputFactory
from XXE, do this:
// This disables DTDs entirely for that factory
xmlInputFactory.setProperty(XMLInputFactory.SUPPORT_DTD, false);
// disable external entities
xmlInputFactory.setProperty("javax.xml.stream.isSupportingExternalEntities", false);
Oracle DOM Parser¶
Follow Oracle reomendation e.g.:
// Extend oracle.xml.parser.v2.XMLParser
DOMParser domParser = new DOMParser();
// Do not expand entity references
domParser.setAttribute(DOMParser.EXPAND_ENTITYREF, false);
// dtdObj is an instance of oracle.xml.parser.v2.DTD
domParser.setAttribute(DOMParser.DTD_OBJECT, dtdObj);
// Do not allow more than 11 levels of entity expansion
domParser.setAttribute(DOMParser.ENTITY_EXPANSION_DEPTH, 12);
TransformerFactory¶
To protect a javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory
from XXE, do this:
TransformerFactory tf = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
tf.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "");
tf.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_STYLESHEET, "");
Validator¶
To protect a javax.xml.validation.Validator
from XXE, do this:
SchemaFactory factory = SchemaFactory.newInstance("http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema");
Schema schema = factory.newSchema();
Validator validator = schema.newValidator();
validator.setProperty(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "");
validator.setProperty(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA, "");
SchemaFactory¶
To protect a javax.xml.validation.SchemaFactory
from XXE, do this:
SchemaFactory factory = SchemaFactory.newInstance("http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema");
factory.setProperty(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "");
factory.setProperty(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA, "");
Schema schema = factory.newSchema(Source);
SAXTransformerFactory¶
To protect a javax.xml.transform.sax.SAXTransformerFactory
from XXE, do this:
SAXTransformerFactory sf = SAXTransformerFactory.newInstance();
sf.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "");
sf.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_STYLESHEET, "");
sf.newXMLFilter(Source);
Note: Use of the following XMLConstants
requires JAXP 1.5, which was added to Java in 7u40 and Java 8:
javax.xml.XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD
javax.xml.XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA
javax.xml.XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_STYLESHEET
XMLReader¶
To protect a Java org.xml.sax.XMLReader
from XXE, do this:
XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
reader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
// This may not be strictly required as DTDs shouldn't be allowed at all, per previous line.
reader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
reader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
reader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
SAXReader¶
To protect a Java org.dom4j.io.SAXReader
from XXE, do this:
saxReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
saxReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
saxReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
Based on testing, if you are missing one of these, you can still be vulnerable to an XXE attack.
SAXBuilder¶
To protect a Java org.jdom2.input.SAXBuilder
from XXE, do this:
SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();
builder.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl",true);
builder.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
builder.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
Document doc = builder.build(new File(fileName));
No-op EntityResolver¶
For APIs that take an EntityResolver
, you can neutralize an XML parser's ability to resolve entities by supplying a no-op implementation:
public final class NoOpEntityResolver implements EntityResolver {
public InputSource resolveEntity(String publicId, String systemId) {
return new InputSource(new StringReader(""));
}
}
// ...
xmlReader.setEntityResolver(new NoOpEntityResolver());
documentBuilder.setEntityResolver(new NoOpEntityResolver());
or more simply:
EntityResolver noop = (publicId, systemId) -> new InputSource(new StringReader(""));
xmlReader.setEntityResolver(noop);
documentBuilder.setEntityResolver(noop);
JAXB Unmarshaller¶
Since a javax.xml.bind.Unmarshaller
parses XML and does not support any flags for disabling XXE, it's imperative to parse the untrusted XML through a configurable secure parser first, generate a source object as a result, and pass the source object to the Unmarshaller. For example:
//Disable XXE
SAXParserFactory spf = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
spf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
spf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
spf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
//Do unmarshall operation
Source xmlSource = new SAXSource(spf.newSAXParser().getXMLReader(),
new InputSource(new StringReader(xml)));
JAXBContext jc = JAXBContext.newInstance(Object.class);
Unmarshaller um = jc.createUnmarshaller();
um.unmarshal(xmlSource);
XPathExpression¶
A javax.xml.xpath.XPathExpression
can not be configured securely by itself, so the untrusted data must be parsed through another securable XML parser first.
For example:
DocumentBuilderFactory df = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
df.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "");
df.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA, "");
DocumentBuilder builder = df.newDocumentBuilder();
String result = new XPathExpression().evaluate( builder.parse(
new ByteArrayInputStream(xml.getBytes())) );
java.beans.XMLDecoder¶
The readObject() method in this class is fundamentally unsafe.
Not only is the XML it parses subject to XXE, but the method can be used to construct any Java object, and execute arbitrary code as described here.
And there is no way to make use of this class safe except to trust or properly validate the input being passed into it.
As such, we'd strongly recommend completely avoiding the use of this class and replacing it with a safe or properly configured XML parser as described elsewhere in this cheat sheet.
Other XML Parsers¶
There are many third-party libraries that parse XML either directly or through their use of other libraries. Please test and verify their XML parser is secure against XXE by default. If the parser is not secure by default, look for flags supported by the parser to disable all possible external resource inclusions like the examples given above. If there's no control exposed to the outside, make sure the untrusted content is passed through a secure parser first and then passed to insecure third-party parser similar to how the Unmarshaller is secured.
Spring Framework MVC/OXM XXE Vulnerabilities¶
For example, some XXE vulnerabilities were found in Spring OXM and Spring MVC. The following versions of the Spring Framework are vulnerable to XXE:
- 3.0.0 to 3.2.3 (Spring OXM & Spring MVC)
- 4.0.0.M1 (Spring OXM)
- 4.0.0.M1-4.0.0.M2 (Spring MVC)
There were other issues as well that were fixed later, so to fully address these issues, Spring recommends you upgrade to Spring Framework 3.2.8+ or 4.0.2+.
For Spring OXM, this is referring to the use of org.springframework.oxm.jaxb.Jaxb2Marshaller. Note that the CVE for Spring OXM specifically indicates that 2 XML parsing situations are up to the developer to get right, and 2 are the responsibility of Spring and were fixed to address this CVE.
Here's what they say:
Two situations developers must handle:
- For a
DOMSource
, the XML has already been parsed by user code and that code is responsible for protecting against XXE. - For a
StAXSource
, the XMLStreamReader has already been created by user code and that code is responsible for protecting against XXE.
The issue Spring fixed:
For SAXSource and StreamSource instances, Spring processed external entities by default thereby creating this vulnerability.
Here's an example of using a StreamSource that was vulnerable, but is now safe, if you are using a fixed version of Spring OXM or Spring MVC:
import org.springframework.oxm.Jaxb2Marshaller;
import org.springframework.oxm.jaxb.Jaxb2Marshaller;
Jaxb2Marshaller marshaller = new Jaxb2Marshaller();
// Must cast return Object to whatever type you are unmarshalling
marshaller.unmarshal(new StreamSource(new StringReader(some_string_containing_XML));
So, per the Spring OXM CVE writeup, the above is now safe. But if you were to use a DOMSource or StAXSource instead, it would be up to you to configure those sources to be safe from XXE.
Castor¶
Castor is a data binding framework for Java. It allows conversion between Java objects, XML, and relational tables. The XML features in Castor prior to version 1.3.3 are vulnerable to XXE, and should be upgraded to the latest version. For additional information, check the official XML configuration file
.NET¶
The following information for XXE injection in .NET is directly from this web application of unit tests by Dean Fleming.
This web application covers all currently supported .NET XML parsers, and has test cases for each demonstrating when they are safe from XXE injection and when they are not.
Previously, this information was based on James Jardine's excellent .NET XXE article.
It originally provided more recent and more detailed information than the older article from Microsoft on how to prevent XXE and XML Denial of Service in .NET, however, it has some inaccuracies that the web application covers.
The following table lists all supported .NET XML parsers and their default safety levels:
XML Parser | Safe by default? |
---|---|
LINQ to XML | Yes |
XmlDictionaryReader | Yes |
XmlDocument | |
...prior to 4.5.2 | No |
...in versions 4.5.2+ | Yes |
XmlNodeReader | Yes |
XmlReader | Yes |
XmlTextReader | |
...prior to 4.5.2 | No |
...in versions 4.5.2+ | Yes |
XPathNavigator | |
...prior to 4.5.2 | No |
...in versions 4.5.2+ | Yes |
XslCompiledTransform | Yes |
LINQ to XML¶
Both the XElement
and XDocument
objects in the System.Xml.Linq
library are safe from XXE injection by default. XElement
parses only the elements within the XML file, so DTDs are ignored altogether. XDocument
has DTDs disabled by default, and is only unsafe if constructed with a different unsafe XML parser.
XmlDictionaryReader¶
System.Xml.XmlDictionaryReader
is safe by default, as when it attempts to parse the DTD, the compiler throws an exception saying that "CData elements not valid at top level of an XML document". It becomes unsafe if constructed with a different unsafe XML parser.
XmlDocument¶
Prior to .NET Framework version 4.5.2, System.Xml.XmlDocument
is unsafe by default. The XmlDocument
object has an XmlResolver
object within it that needs to be set to null in versions prior to 4.5.2. In versions 4.5.2 and up, this XmlResolver
is set to null by default.
The following example shows how it is made safe:
static void LoadXML()
{
string xxePayload = "<!DOCTYPE doc [<!ENTITY win SYSTEM 'file:///C:/Users/testdata2.txt'>]>"
+ "<doc>&win;</doc>";
string xml = "<?xml version='1.0' ?>" + xxePayload;
XmlDocument xmlDoc = new XmlDocument();
// Setting this to NULL disables DTDs - Its NOT null by default.
xmlDoc.XmlResolver = null;
xmlDoc.LoadXml(xml);
Console.WriteLine(xmlDoc.InnerText);
Console.ReadLine();
}
XmlDocument
can become unsafe if you create your own nonnull XmlResolver
with default or unsafe settings. If you need to enable DTD processing, instructions on how to do so safely are described in detail in the referenced MSDN article.
XmlNodeReader¶
System.Xml.XmlNodeReader
objects are safe by default and will ignore DTDs even when constructed with an unsafe parser or wrapped in another unsafe parser.
XmlReader¶
System.Xml.XmlReader
objects are safe by default.
They are set by default to have their ProhibitDtd property set to false in .NET Framework versions 4.0 and earlier, or their DtdProcessing
property set to Prohibit in .NET versions 4.0 and later.
Additionally, in .NET versions 4.5.2 and later, the XmlReaderSettings
belonging to the XmlReader
has its XmlResolver
set to null by default, which provides an additional layer of safety.
Therefore, XmlReader
objects will only become unsafe in version 4.5.2 and up if both the DtdProcessing
property is set to Parse and the XmlReaderSetting
's XmlResolver
is set to a nonnull XmlResolver with default or unsafe settings. If you need to enable DTD processing, instructions on how to do so safely are described in detail in the referenced MSDN article.
XmlTextReader¶
System.Xml.XmlTextReader
is unsafe by default in .NET Framework versions prior to 4.5.2. Here is how to make it safe in various .NET versions:
Prior to .NET 4.0¶
In .NET Framework versions prior to 4.0, DTD parsing behavior for XmlReader
objects like XmlTextReader
are controlled by the Boolean ProhibitDtd
property found in the System.Xml.XmlReaderSettings
and System.Xml.XmlTextReader
classes.
Set these values to true to disable inline DTDs completely.
XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader(stream);
// NEEDED because the default is FALSE!!
reader.ProhibitDtd = true;
.NET 4.0 - .NET 4.5.2¶
In .NET Framework version 4.0, DTD parsing behavior has been changed. The ProhibitDtd
property has been deprecated in favor of the new DtdProcessing
property.
However, they didn't change the default settings so XmlTextReader
is still vulnerable to XXE by default.
Setting DtdProcessing
to Prohibit
causes the runtime to throw an exception if a <!DOCTYPE>
element is present in the XML.
To set this value yourself, it looks like this:
XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader(stream);
// NEEDED because the default is Parse!!
reader.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit;
Alternatively, you can set the DtdProcessing
property to Ignore
, which will not throw an exception on encountering a <!DOCTYPE>
element but will simply skip over it and not process it. Finally, you can set DtdProcessing
to Parse
if you do want to allow and process inline DTDs.
.NET 4.5.2 and later¶
In .NET Framework versions 4.5.2 and up, XmlTextReader
's internal XmlResolver
is set to null by default, making the XmlTextReader
ignore DTDs by default. The XmlTextReader
can become unsafe if if you create your own nonnull XmlResolver
with default or unsafe settings.
XPathNavigator¶
System.Xml.XPath.XPathNavigator
is unsafe by default in .NET Framework versions prior to 4.5.2.
This is due to the fact that it implements IXPathNavigable
objects like XmlDocument
, which are also unsafe by default in versions prior to 4.5.2.
You can make XPathNavigator
safe by giving it a safe parser like XmlReader
(which is safe by default) in the XPathDocument
's constructor.
Here is an example:
XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create("example.xml");
XPathDocument doc = new XPathDocument(reader);
XPathNavigator nav = doc.CreateNavigator();
string xml = nav.InnerXml.ToString();
XslCompiledTransform¶
System.Xml.Xsl.XslCompiledTransform
(an XML transformer) is safe by default as long as the parser it's given is safe.
It is safe by default because the default parser of the Transform()
methods is an XmlReader
, which is safe by default (per above).
The source code for this method is here.
Some of the Transform()
methods accept an XmlReader
or IXPathNavigable
(e.g., XmlDocument
) as an input, and if you pass in an unsafe XML Parser then the Transform
will also be unsafe.
iOS¶
libxml2¶
iOS includes the C/C++ libxml2 library described above, so that guidance applies if you are using libxml2 directly.
However, the version of libxml2 provided up through iOS6 is prior to version 2.9 of libxml2 (which protects against XXE by default).
NSXMLDocument¶
iOS also provides an NSXMLDocument
type, which is built on top of libxml2.
However, NSXMLDocument
provides some additional protections against XXE that aren't available in libxml2 directly.
Per the 'NSXMLDocument External Entity Restriction API' section of this page:
- iOS4 and earlier: All external entities are loaded by default.
- iOS5 and later: Only entities that don't require network access are loaded. (which is safer)
However, to completely disable XXE in an NSXMLDocument
in any version of iOS you simply specify NSXMLNodeLoadExternalEntitiesNever
when creating the NSXMLDocument
.
PHP¶
Per the PHP documentation, the following should be set when using the default PHP XML parser in order to prevent XXE:
libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);
A description of how to abuse this in PHP is presented in a good SensePost article describing a cool PHP based XXE vulnerability that was fixed in Facebook.
Python¶
The Python 3 official documentation contains a section on xml vulnerabilities. As of the 1st January 2020 Python 2 is no longer supported, however the Python website still contains some legacy documentation.
The following table gives an overview of various modules in Python 3 used for XML parsing and whether or not they are vulnerable.
Attack Type | sax | etree | minidom | pulldom | xmlrpc |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Billion Laughs | Vulnerable | Vulnerable | Vulnerable | Vulnerable | Vulnerable |
Quadratic Blowup | Vulnerable | Vulnerable | Vulnerable | Vulnerable | Vulnerable |
External Entity Expansion | Safe | Safe | Safe | Safe | Safe |
DTD Retrieval | Safe | Safe | Safe | Safe | Safe |
Decompression Bomb | Safe | Safe | Safe | Safe | Vulnerable |
To protect your application from the applicable attacks, two packages exist to help you sanitize your input and protect your application against DDoS and remote attacks.
Semgrep Rules¶
Semgrep is a command-line tool for offline static analysis. Use pre-built or custom rules to enforce code and security standards in your codebase.
Java¶
Below are the rules for different XML parsers in Java
Digester¶
Identifying XXE vulnerability in the org.apache.commons.digester3.Digester
library
Rule can be played here https://semgrep.dev/s/salecharohit:xxe-Digester
DocumentBuilderFactory¶
Identifying XXE vulnerability in the javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory
library
Rule can be played here https://semgrep.dev/s/salecharohit:xxe-dbf
SAXBuilder¶
Identifying XXE vulnerability in the org.jdom2.input.SAXBuilder
library
Rule can be played here https://semgrep.dev/s/salecharohit:xxe-saxbuilder
SAXParserFactory¶
Identifying XXE vulnerability in the javax.xml.parsers.SAXParserFactory
library
Rule can be played here https://semgrep.dev/s/salecharohit:xxe-SAXParserFactory
SAXReader¶
Identifying XXE vulnerability in the org.dom4j.io.SAXReader
library
Rule can be played here https://semgrep.dev/s/salecharohit:xxe-SAXReader
XMLInputFactory¶
Identifying XXE vulnerability in the javax.xml.stream.XMLInputFactory
library
Rule can be played here https://semgrep.dev/s/salecharohit:xxe-XMLInputFactory
XMLReader¶
Identifying XXE vulnerability in the org.xml.sax.XMLReader
library
Rule can be played here https://semgrep.dev/s/salecharohit:xxe-XMLReader